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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Priority No. 2
v.
Case No. 950226-CA

PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY,
Defendant/Appellant
1

1

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from defendant's conviction for kidnapping, a second-degree
felony, kidnapping, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995). Therefore, this
Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1994).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

When defendant pled guilty on October 3, 1994 and did not file a motion

to withdraw his guilty plea until November 28, 1994, was his motion barred by the
thirty-day jurisdictional limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995)?
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews
without deference to the trial court. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).
2.

Is defendant's challenge to the $10,000 fine and mandatory 85 percent

surcharge precluded because he did not object tc the sentence before the trial court?

State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993), states the criteria by
which this Court determines waiver.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Relevant provisions are included in the addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history
The State charged defendant with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a firstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995) (R. 5). Six months
after he was charged, defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(d) (1995) (R. 94). The trial court then
informed defendant of the 30-day time period in which to file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea (R. 154). At the plea, Brooke Wells, Salt Lake Legal Defenders', served
as defendant's appointed counsel (R. 17).

Shortly after entering his plea, defendant

asked for different counsel and his current attorney, Mary Corporon, was then
appointed (R. 103). Fifty-five days after he pled guilty, defendant filed a motion to
extend the time in which to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 106-7). On the same day, he
also filed a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 113).
On February 3, 1995, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether defendant had good cause to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 159). Defendant
testified and the State called Brooke Wells (idj. After hearing the testimony, the trial
2

court concluded that defendant had not shown good cause, denied the motion to
withdraw, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in prison,
a $10,000 fine, and an 85 percent surcharge (R. 217-26).
Statement of facts
The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R. 8). On April 13,
1994, defendant was in an apartment in Salt Lake . ^unty when an eight-year old boy,
H.M. entered. Defendant then shut the door, locked it, and grabbed H.M. by the neck,
forcing him into the bedroom. Defendant pulled H.M.'s clothes down to his ankles,
forced him onto a mattress face first and began fondling his buttocks. H.M. began to
struggle and defendant banged H.M.'s head into a wall and told him to shut up.
Defendant's conduct ended when two individuals knocked on the apartment door.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should not review *he merits of defendant's appeal because, due to
his failure to request withdrawal of his guilty plea within 30 days, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the merits. The 30 day time limit is jurisdictional and, unlike
other jurisdictional deadlines for filing notices of appeal and petitions for certiorari,
Utah Coat Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) does not allow for extensions of time after the initial
30 day period. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of a $10,000 fine
also should be rejected on procedural grounds because he did not object at trial and
does not now argue plain error.
3

ARGUMENT
1.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA CAME MORE THAN 30 DAYS
AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA, THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW THE MERITS OF THE REQUEST AND
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION ON THAT
BASIS.

When defendant entered his guilty plea, the trial court told him that he had 30
days to request to withdraw it (R. 154). Because the trial court provided defendant this
information, the 30-day time limit in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) became
jurisdictional and should have precluded the trial court from considering the merits of
the request. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah App. 1992). On appeal then,
this Court need not decide the merits of defendant's request, but should deny the appeal
solely due to the untimeliness of the request. Defendant's motion to extend the time to
withdraw his guilty plea does not save the withdrawal request because that motion also
was filed after the jurisdictional time limit had expired (R. 106).
Procedurally, the trial court lost jurisdiction to withdraw the plea thirty-one days
after defendant entered it, i.e., on November 3, 1994. Section 77-13-6 does not allow
a defendant to resurrect jurisdiction by filing a late motion to extend time.

Compare

Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (1995) (allowing extension of time to file notice of appeal after
expiration of thirty days) ami Utah R. App. P. 48(e) (1995) (providing extension

4

procedure for late petitions for certiorari after lapse of thirty days) with Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(d) (1995) (not providing for extensions). Therefore, the court did
not have jurisdiction over defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite its
holding of an evidentiary hearing and refusal to deny solely on timeliness grounds (R.
218). In Price, this Court specifically held that, because the 30-day time limit was
jurisdictional, it could not be waived and, thus, could be raised for the first time on
appeal. Eltee., 837 P.2d at 583; Olson v. Salt Lake School District. 724 P.2d 960, 964
(Utah 1986) (acquiescence is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, which can be raised for
the first time on appeal). Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain
the merits of defendant's withdraw. motion, this Court should deny the appeal.
D.

BECAUSE DEFEND. NT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE
FINE, TfflS COURTfcHOULDNOT REVIEW HIS
CLAIM OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
APPEAL.

On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a $10,000 fine
and the 85 percent mandatory surcharge as an abuse of di;v retion. Br. of Defendant at
12. Defendant's sentencing occurred immediately after the court denied his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea on February 3, 1995 v

his current counsel, Mary

Corporon, was his attorney (R. 225 26). The court sentenced defendant pursuant to
statute, committing him to prison for an indeterminate term of -•!. --to-fifteen years and
imposing a $10,000 fine (R. 225-26). Along with the fine, L\C court imposed the

5

surcharge that Utah Code Ann. § 63-63a-l(l) (1993) mandates and restitution (R. 226).
Defendant did not object but instead, responded in the negative to the court's question
whether anything had been overlooked (isL).
Because defendant did not give the trial court the opportunity to address his
objection to the fine, he cannot now raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See
State v.Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994); State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798,
801 n.4 (Utah 1990) (affirming that rule precluding review of issues raised for first
time on appeal applies to sentencing hearings); State v. Snyder. 747 P.2d 417, 421
(Utah 1987) (refusing to address issue because defendant did not object to restitution
order in trial court); State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (applying to
sentencing issues the "longstanding rule" that issues raised for the first time on appeal
are waived). Defendant can avoid the consequences of his waiver only if he shows
plain error. State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). However, he has not
argued that plain error occurred. Therefore, this Court should refuse to address the
merits of defendant's sentencing challenge. Bywater. 748 P.2d at 569.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.

6

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPIMON NOT REQUESTED
Because the facts and arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, and
because this case does not present an issue requiring further development or
clarification, the State does not request oral argument or publication.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TfflS2£&»y of July 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
iS'H: BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the22?day of July 1995 I caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
MARY C. CORPORON
Corporon & Williams
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

63-63a-L Surcharge - Application and exemptions.
(1) (a) A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by
the courts.
(b) The surcharge shall be:
(i) 85% upon conviction of a:
(A) felony;
(B) class A misdemeanor;
(C) violation of Title 4F, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless
Driving; or
(D) class B misdemeanor not cL:.csified within Title 41, Motor Vehicles, including violation
of comparable county or municipal ordinances; or
(ii) 35% upon conviction of any other offens- including violation of county or municipal
ordinances not subject to the 85% surcharge.
(2) The surcharge shall not be imposed:
(a) upon nonmoving traffic violations;
(b) upon court orders when the offender is ordered to perform community service work in
lieu of paying afine;and
(c) upon penalties assessed by the juvenile court as part of the nonjudicial adjustment of a
case under Section 78-3a-22.
(3) (a) The surcharge and the exceptions under Subsections (1) and (2) also apply to all fines,
penalties, and forfeitures imposed on juveniles for conduct that would be criminal if committed
by an adult.
(b) However, the surcharge does not include amounts assessed or collected separately by
juvenile courts for the Juvenile Restitution Account, which is independent of this chapter and
does not affect the imposition or collection of the surcharge.
(4) The surcharge under this section shall be imposed in addition to the fine charged for a
criminal offense, and no reduction may be made in the fine charged due to the surcharge
imposition.
(5) Fees, assessments, and surcharges related to criminal or traffic offenses shall be
authorized and managed by this chapter rather than attached to particular offenses.

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company

76-3-30L Fines of persons.
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay afine,not exceeding:
(a) $10,000 when the conviction is of a felony of thefirstdegree or second degree;
(b) $5,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor;
(d) $1,000 when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor;
(e) $750 when the conviction is of a class C misdemeanor or infractiaia; and
(f ) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, government, or
governmental instrumentality.

(c) 1953-1995 By The i tichie Company

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filea in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court
by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall runfromthe
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and
on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal
was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period
last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30
days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company

%

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to com action.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made
within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

t Company

Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Appeals.
The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the petition.
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refixse to receive any petition for a writ of certiorari
which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or which is not accompanied by
the docket fee.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari runs
from the date the decision isfenteredby the Court of Appeals, notfromthe date of the issuance of
the remittitur. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or of
the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.
(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this rule will not be
granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition. The clerk shall refuse
any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket fee.
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other filing. The clerk
of the court shall refuse any filing so joined.
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or
(c) of this rule, whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise requires. Notice of any
such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other
parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the same as provided in Rule 26.
(Amended effective October 1,1992.)

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company
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837 P.2d 578
(Cite as: 837 P.2d 578)
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v,
Micheal D. PRICE, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 910111-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

[5] CRIMINAL LAW <S=* 274(9)
110k274(9)
Defendant's failure to file motion to withdraw guilty
plea within time period allowed by statute deprived
trial court of jurisdiction to hear motion, where
court had informed defendant of time limit at plea
hearing.
U.C \1953,
77-13-6(2)(b);
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g) (Repealed).

Jul) 23, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., of
aggravated assault, and he appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J., held that: (1)
guilty plea was voluntary, and (2) motion to
withdraw guilty plea was untimely.

[6] CRIMINAL LAW <3=* 1044.2(1)
HOkJO^ 2fl)
Althc-z: s: *e failed to raise issue of timeliness of
defener < XIK,. on to withdraw his guilty plea
before tn*4, „ ^ur. ." suit of Appeals could address it
for first time w.- appeal because it presented
jurisdictional question.
U.C.A ' ' 77-136(2)(b); U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(5)(gj sKc^caled).

Affirmed.
{Bench, P.J., concurred specially and filed
statement.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <$=» 1028
110kl028
Defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial
court is barred from asserting it inh ally on
[2] CRIMINAL LAW <$=> 1028
110kl028
Appellate court may address issue for first time on
appeal if trial court committed plain error or there
are exceptional circumstances.
[3] CRIMINAL LAW 3=> 273(4.1)
110k273(4.1)
Formerly 110k273(4)
Strict compliance with criminal procedures for
guilty pleas can be accomplished by maniple means
so long as record reflects that all requirements have
been fulfilled.
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g)
(Repealed).
[4] CRIMINAL LAW *=> 273.1(4)
110k273.1(4)
Defendant's plea affidavit and plea colloquy
transcript reflected that court had complied with all
requirements for accepting defendant's guilty plea;
trial court established that defendant understood
elements of offense, and had discussed affidavit with
counsel and understood it, and thus, reflected that
plea was voluntary. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-1 l(5)(g)
(R^oealed).

r

*\ \L LAW <&* 274(3.1)

Formerly U0K274(3)
Trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to set
aside guilty plea in light of new evidence.
[8] CRIMINAL LAW G* 274(8)
110k274(8)
Defendant's stateme^s r nng pro se argument to
withdraw his •:
?h thai he and his neighbors
believn
.. .i.^e, were not sufficient to set
aside pie n grounds of new, exculpatory evidence;
defendant failed to present affidavits from potential
witnesses cr even a plausible versior. of the U y$
more la/orable to him.
U.C A.. 1953, 7 35ll(5)(g) (Repealed).
•*™ Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, for
deu .uant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD,
JJ.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
i-'tfendant Micheal Dean Price appeals the trial
court's denial of his pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea to a charge of attempted aggravated
assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and -102(4) (1990). We
affirm.

Copr. • West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works

837 P.2d 578
(Cite as: 837 P.2d 578, »579)
FACTS
Defendant was arrested and charged with
aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990),
resulting from a domestic dispute. On December
18, 1990, pursuant to a plea agreement, -defendant
pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of attempted
aggravated assault, a class A jnisdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and
102(4) (1990).
During the plea proceeding, defendant's counsel
informed the court he had discussed the entry of a
guilty plea with defendant "on numerous occasions"
and was persuaded that defendant comprehended
"the effect and meaning" of such a plea. Defendant
also stated he had consulted *580 with his counsel
and understood the guilty plea.
In connection with his guilty plea, defendant
executed a "Statement of Defendant." This affidavit
indicated that defendant's plea was made
"voluntarily," defendant understood the "nature and
elements" of attempted aggravated assault, and
defendant waived certain enumerated "statutory and
constitutional rights." The affidavit also described
the elements of attempted aggravated assault.
Defendant informed the court he had read the
affidavit, discussed it with his counsel and
understood it.
The court reviewed the affidavit on the record
with defendant during the plea proceeding.
Specifically, the court questioned defendant about
the voluntary nature of his guilty plea, the
constitutional rights defendant was waiving, and
defendant's understanding of the elements of
attempted aggravated assault. Defendant expressed
concern only about his potential sentence. In
response, the court explained that, while probation
was not "guaranteed," he would give "serious
consideration" to the recommendations of the
prosecution and the Adult Probation and Parole
office. Following the plea colloquy, the court
accepted defendant's guilty plea as "freely,
voluntarily and knowingly executed." The court
then advised defendant he had the right to move to
set aside his guilty plea within thirty days.
By handwritten letter dated January 18, 1991,
thirty-one days after the plea proceeding, defendant
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notified the court that he wished to withdraw his
guilty plea.
On January 29, 1991, immediately prior to
sentencing defendant, the court heard defendant's
pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although
defendant was represented by counsel at this
hearing, defendant argued his motion pro se because
his counsel did not believe defendant had a valid
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. [FN1]
Defendant asserted he was not guilty of attempted
aggravated assault, and that neighbors agreed with
him. The State objected to defendant's motion but
presented no argument in opposition, including no
claim that defendant's motion was untimely. The
court denied defendant's pro se motion because
defendant "established no legal reason" for the court
to set aside defendant's guilty plea.
FN1. At the hearing, defendant's counsel stated:
My belief is that in order tofilea motion, we need
to have a valid reason, so it sort of puts me at odds
with Mr. Price. His expression to me was he'd
changed his mind. My reading of the statute is that
does not provide a reason for change of plea, but he
may want to talk to you about it, but it sort of puts
me in an awkward position.
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred
by: (1) Accepting defendant's guilty plea without
establishing that defendant understood the "nature
and elements of the offense," thus failing to comply
with Rule 11 of' the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and (2) denying defendant's pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in view of new
evidence favorable to defendant and the fact that his
initial plea was not voluntary. The State responds
that we do not have jurisdiction of this appeal as
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
untimely.
RULE 11 AND VOLUNTARY PLEA
Defendant first argues the trial court failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the common
law requirements of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), in accepting his guilty plea.
Specifically, defendant alleges the trial court failed
to adequately establish that he understood the nature
and elements of the offense charged and, thus, that
his plea was voluntary. The State correctly contends
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defendant raises these arguments 'for the first time on
appeal.
[1][2] As a general rule, "a defendant who fails to
bring an issue before the trial court is bdJrred from
asserting it initially on appeal."
State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.1991);
accord State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah
1989). However, an appellate court may address an
issue for the first time on appeal if: "(1) the trial
court committed 'plain error,' or (2) there are
'exceptional circumstances.* " *581 Archambeau,
820 P.2d at 922. We find neither.
[3] In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court: declared::
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the
burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e)
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered." [FN2] Id. at 1312. The Utah Supreme
Court recently clarified the test for reviewing the
validity of post-Gibbons guilty pleas in an advisory
opinion, State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah
1992). In Maguire, the supreme court stated:
FN2. Rule 11(e) has been replaced in part by Rule
11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Utah R.Crim.P. 11 amendment notes
^ye
restate our holding 'that (1) strict:
compliance with the elements of rule 11 is
required in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) said
Compliance may be demonstrated on appeal by
reference to the record of the plea proceedings.
When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in
the record (as when the trial judge ascertains in
the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has
understood, and acknowledges all the information
contained therein), they may properly form a part
of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance.
Id. at 217. The court explained the meaning of "the
record of the plea proceedings" as follows:
The record before an appellate court must contain
a basis for [Rule 11(5) ] findings, but that record
may reflect such a basis by multiple means, e.g.,
transcript of the oral colloquy between the court
and defendant, contents of a written affidavit that
the record reflects was read, understood, and
acknowledged by defendant and the court,
contents of other documents such as the
informati n, presentence reports, exhibits, etc.,
similarly incorporated into the record, and so on.
"Tierefore, "strict: compliance can be

accomp ed by multiple means so long as no
requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the
record reflects that the requirement has been
t ulfPV m V.
Defends. w«***« die trial court failed to
adequately inform him of the elements of the offense
charged. Specifically, defendant argues that, when
he demonstrated confusion during the plea colloquy,
the trial court rushed him into answering rather than
clarifying his uncertainty, such that his plea was not
voluntary. The record reveals that the trial court
recited the facts and elements of the crime charged
and asked defendant if they were correct. Initially,
defendant responded affirmatively. However, when
the trial court inquired again, defendant apparently
hesitated. The trial court responded as follows:
Mr. Price, I'm not going to play games with you.
If you want to go to trial, then we'll go to trial.
I'm -not going to spend the morning in here with
you while you're pondering.
Now, have you made up your mind? Are you
going to plead or are you not going to plead?
We'll go to trial tomorrow morning with a jury if
you want that.
Defendant subsequently replied again that he * ished
to plead guilty.
[4] We do not find error in the trial court's
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea, certainly not
plain error. Our examination of both defendant's
plea affidavit and the plea colloquy transcript,
pursuant to Maguire, confirms that all of the
elements of Rule 11(5) were reviewed, with
defendant, including his understanding of the
elements of the offense. Furthermore, the trial court
established that defendant had discussed the affidavit
with counsel and understood it. The trial court,
therefore, met its burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11 requirements were
satisfied.
We are persuaded that defendant
understood the elements of the offense with which
he was charged and, thus, that his plea was
voluntary.
TIMELINESS OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
Gt JII TYPI EA
Tli !:! State argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction
1: z c : )i: :i sidei defendant's p r o se *582 motion to
ithdi a his g iltt; plea because defendant did not
file Ms motion within thirty days of 'the plea
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proceeding, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(b) (1990), even though he was informed of the
thirty-day deadline in the plea affidavit he signed
and by the judge during the plea colloquy.
Defendant responds that the State may not raise this
timeliness issue for the first time on appeal. The
State concedes the timeliness issue was not raised
below but claims this question of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time.
Section 77-13-6(2)(b) providjfc "A request to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the
entry of the plea." This time limit, however, must
be construed in conjunction with Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule ll(5)(g)
states: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found ... the defendant has been
advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest." Rule 11(6)
provides: "Failure to advise the defendant of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the
time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6."
Therefore, although the language of section 77-136(2)(b) is unconditional, it is subject to an exception
incorporated within Rule 11.
Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, filed thirty-one days after the entry of
defendant's guilty plea, was clearly untimely. The
issue before this court thus becomes whether section
77-13-6(2)(b), in view of Rule 11, presents a
jurisdictional question and, thus, whether we may
consider the State's untimeliness argument for the
first time on appeal.
Utah's appellate courts have interpreted time
limitations in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
similar to that imposed by section 77-13-6(2)(b) as
jurisdictional. For example, Rule 4 states that a
notice of an appeal as of right "shall be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the
date of entiy of the judgment or order appealed
from."
Utah R.App.P. 4(a).
Despite this
"jurisdictional" language, however, the rule also
provides that trial courts, "upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed
not later than 30 days" after the initial thirty-day
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deadline. Utah R.App.P. 4(e). Nonetheless, we
have concluded Rule 4(a)'s thirty-day deadline is
jurisdictional. [FN3]
FN3. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522
(Utah App.1989) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction
to hear appeal as of right when defendant's notice
of appeal is untimely and defendant failed to file a
Rule 4(e) motion to extend); In re M.S., 781 P.2d
1287, 1289 (Utah App.1989) (per curiam) (court
remanded case to juvenile court for decision as to
whether time for filing appeal may be extended
under Rule 4(e) but noted *[i]f the juvenile court
declines to extend the time for appeal, the appeal
will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction").
Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
also contains unconditional "jurisdictional" language
qualified by an exception. It states: "A petition for
a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of
the decision by the Court of Appeals." Utah
R.App.P. 48(a). Nevertheless, the rule provides
that the supreme court, "upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30
days" after the original deadline. Utah R.App.P.
48(e). The Utah Supreme Court recently interpreted
this rule in Earle v. Warden of Utah State Prison,
811 P.2d 180 (Utah 1991). [FN4] In Earle, the
supreme court determined it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the defendant's petition for certiorari because
the petition was untimely. See id. at 180. The
court noted that, because the defendant never filed a
petition for rehearing with the Utah Court of
Appeals or a motion to extend the time for filing a
petition to the supreme court, "the *583 time in
which a petition for certiorari could be accepted by
this court expired." Id. at 181.
FN4. The case refers to Rule 45 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court. However, this rule currently
appears as Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Although Rules 4 and 48 contain provisions which
allow courts to extend the applicable filing periods
under certain circumstances, Utah's appellate courts
have held f at such provisions do not destroy the
jurisdictional nature of these time limit rules.
Rather, these provisions merely permit the filing
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period to be extended if a defendant complies with
their requirements.
Defendant cites two recent cases from this court
which he contends hold that section 77-13-6(2)(b) is
not jurisdictional. In State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470
(Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1992), the defendant, in September 1989,
moved to withdraw his no contest plea, pursuant to
section 77-13-6. See id. at 474. The trial court
denied the motion. See id
On appeal, the State argued the defendant's
motion was untimely. See id. at 475. The State
contended the April 1989 amendment to section 7713-6, adding the thirty-day deadline for filing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, should apply
retroactively to the defendant. See id. This court
found it unnecessary even to reach the retroactivity
issue because "the State's untimeliness argument was
not raised in the trial court, and was therefore not
preserved for appeal." Id. at 476.
Wc followed the reasoning of Smith in State v.
Quintana, 826 P.2d 1068 (Utah App.1991), In
Quintana, the defendant appealed the denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See id. at 1069.
The State conceded the trial court violated Rule 11
in accepting the plea but argued the thirty-day
deadline of amended section 77-13-6 should apply
retroactively, rendering the trial court without
jurisdiction to address the defendant's motion. See
id. Looking to Smith, this court noted that there
"the State had failed to preserve appellant's lack of
compliance with the statute as an issue to consider
on appeal." Id.
Therefore, we reversed and
remanded, 'instructing the trial court to grant the
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
Defendant has missed the crucial distinction in
these cases. Both Smith and Quintana involved
defendants who pleaded guilty before the thirty-day
filing deadline was added to section 77-13-6.
Therefore, at the time the Smith and Quintana
defendants entered their pleas, they were not
informed of the thirty-day time limit for filing a
motion to withdraw their pleas because there was
none. Thus, the jurisdictional nature of section 7713-6 was not triggered.
(5J In contrast, defendant in the present case was.
informed at the time he pleaded guilty that he had

only thirty days in'.which to file a motion to
withdraw his plea. This is the first time this court
has considered the application of the thirty-day
filing period in section 77-13-6(2)(b) when the
record shows that a defendant was informed of the
thirty-day deadline. If the timeliness issue had been
properly addressed in the trial court, that court
would have been without jurisdiction to hear
defendant's motion and without a basis for
extending the time for defend , to file his motion.
Therefore, Smith and Quintain. which focus on the
retroactive application of section 77-13-6(2)(b) to
defendants who were not informed of its thirty-day
deadline, do not assist defendant.
Like Rules 4 and 48, the unconditional,
jurisdictional nature of section 77-13-6(2)(b)'s filing
deadline is not destroyed when read in light of the
exception in Rule 11 allowing that deadline to be
extended if a defendant has not been informed of the
thirty-day time period. If a defendant is informed of
the statute's thirty-day deadline for filing a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea, section 77-13-6(2)(b) is
jurisdictional, and a failure to file a timely motion to
withdraw a guilty plea 'may be raised for the first
time on appeal.
[6] Although the State failed to raise 'the issue of
the timeliness of defendant's pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea before the trial court, we
may address it for the first time on appeal because it
*584 presents a jut; : ctional question. See A.J.
Mackay Co. v. Okk, v -:r. Co., 817 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1991); Siau \ . Davenport, 30 Utah. 2d
298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 a. 2 (1973). We conclude
the trial court properly denied defendant's motion as
it was untimel}
However, even if we were to reach the merits of
defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea, we
would still affirm. We have already concluded that
defendant's plea was entered in compliance with
Rule 11(5) and Gibbon* and, thus, that defendant's
plea was voluntary. Therefore, defendant's first
ground for setting aside his plea is without merit.
However, defendant also claims the trial court erred
by not allowing defendant to withdraw his plea in
view of new evidence favorable to defendant.
[7] [8] A trial court may abuse its discretion by
failing to set aside a guilty plea in light of new
evidence. [FN5]
In the present case, during
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defendant's pro se argument to withdraw his guilty
plea, defendant stated the basis for his motion was
his and his neighbors' belief in his innocence.
FN5. See, e.g., State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422,
424 (Utah 1987) (trial court correctly denied
defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea because
of the "implausible timing and suspicious content"
of new evidence favorable to defendant); State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042* (Utah 1987) (trial
court erred in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw guilty plea because of "critical new
evidence which cast doubt on defendant's guilt,"
i.e., victim's admission that her testimony at
preliminary hearing wrongly implicated defendant).
On appeal, defendant argues the testimony of his
neighbors presents new, exculpatory evidence.
However, as the State notes, defendant fails to
present affidavits from potential witnesses or even a
plausible version of the facts more favorable to him.
Defendant's motion was supported only by
defendant's statement that he was not guilty and his
self-serving conjecture that others believed him
innocent. These "new" facts are not sufficient to set
aside his plea.
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring specially):
We hold in this case that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In view of that holding, it
is unnecessary (and improper) to opine about the
merits of defendant's motion.
END OF DOCUMENT
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